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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20030056-CA 
v. 
TRACY VALDEZ, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(2)(a)(I), -4(a)(vi) & (vii) (2002), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Fred D. Howard, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is: 
Whether, in the light of compelling evidence, the trial court committed plain error in 
submitting to the jury the question of defendant's presence in a drug-free zone while he 
possessed controlled substances? 
The appellate court reviews an unpreserved claim of insufficient evidence for plain 
error, that is, whether "the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged and . . . that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court 
committed plain error in submitting the case to the jury." State v Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 
17, 10P.3d346. 
STATUTE 
The following determinative statute is attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession or use of methamphetamine in a drug-free 
zone, a first degree felony (Count I), obstructing justice, a second degree felony (Count II), 
and driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license, a class B misdemeanor (Count III) 
(R. 6-7). At the preliminary hearing, Count II was reduced to attempted obstructing justice, 
a third degree felony (R. 6, 26). Defendant moved to suppress evidence (R. 33-41). 
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 76-77, 297). Defendant also 
moved before trial to strike the drug-free-zone sentencing enhancement on constitutional 
grounds as cruel and unusual punishment (R. 97,99-103). At the beginning of trial, the court 
deferred ruling on that motion and dismissed Count III (R. 256; 298:112-14). 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance in a drug-free zone and attempted obstructing justice (R. 190; 298:340). At 
sentencing, considering defendant's previously deferred motion, the trial court reduced 
defendant's conviction on Count I to a second degree felony (R. 282,286). The trial court 
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sentenced defendant to consecutive one-to-fifteen-year and zero-to-five-year terms on Counts 
I and II, respectively (R. 285). Defendant timely appealed (R. 292). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On March 11,2002, Orem City Police Sergeant Gary Giles, an experienced narcotics 
officer, was conducting surveillance on an apartment in which drug activity was suspected 
(R. 298:135-38). The apartment, located at 1565 South and 50 East, was later accurately 
determined by a calibrated "lidar," a hand-held laser device, to be located within 750 feet of 
the parking lot of one church and 950 feet of the parking lot of another church (R. 298:140, 
161-68). The apartment belonged to Ms. Shannon Nielson, who Sergeant Giles knew had 
an outstanding felony warrant. Defendant was known to be living in the apartment (R. 
298:139-41; State's Ex. 2). 
Sergeant Giles was conducting surveillance from a marked patrol car parked on Main 
Street, from which point he had a direct view of Nielson's and defendant's apartment across 
the interceding half-block (R. 298:140-41). About fifteen to twenty minutes after Sergeant 
Giles arrived, someone parked in the apartment's parking lot got into a vehicle and drove 
north on 50 East (R. 298:139-41). Sergeant Giles briefly lost sight of the vehicle as it 
proceeded up the street (R. 298:141-42). Assuming that the car would proceed up 50 East 
to 1450 South and then turn west to reach Main Street, Sergeant Giles drove north on Main 
Street at the same pace of the vehicle he was following and briefly waited at the intersection 
1
 The facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are recited in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ^ [2, 25 P.3d 985. 
3 
of 1450 South and Main Street (R. 298:142). The target vehicle approached, stopped at the 
intersection, and then turned right (north) onto Main Street (R. 198:142; State's Ex. 2). 
Sergeant Giles thought that only about thirty to forty-five seconds had elapsed from the time 
he saw the vehicle leave the apartment until he intercepted it at the intersection of Main 
Street and 1450 South. This was about the same amount of time the sergeant would expect 
such a brief trip to take at normal speed (R. 298:143). When asked if there might have been 
time for the driver to stop and talk to someone or do anything, Sergeant Giles responded, 
"Absolutely not" (R. 298:143-44). 
When the vehicle stopped, Sergeant Giles saw the driver v\ as defendant, with whom 
he was familiar (R. 298:142, 144, 172). Sergeant Giles knew that defendant's license was 
suspended (R. 298:140, 144). After following defendant's vehicle to about 1400 South, 
Sergeant Giles stopped it and immediately called for backup (R. 298:142, 145; State's Ex. 
2). Sergeant Giles noted that the stop was "right next" to or "mere feet" from a "shopping 
center" containing "two shopping malls," which included a Media Play, an Old Navy, a Pet's 
Mart, a Toys CR' Us, a Kids 'R' Us, and an RC Willey (R. 298:172-75, 199, 203). 
Approaching the vehicle, Sergeant Giles asked defendant to exit, at which point Orem 
City Police Officer Art Lopez arrived (R. 198:146-47, 213-14). Sergeant Giles noticed a 
bottle of hard liquor with a broken seal near the center console (R. 198:145-46). Noticing 
that defendant's pockets were bulging, Sergeant Giles asked defendant if he had any weapons 
on him (R. 298:146-47). Defendant immediately pulled out a large folding knife (R. 
198:147). Sergeant Giles then patted defendant's pockets down for weapons. He could feel 
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that there were a number of items in defendant's pockets. Defendant became nervous and 
belligerent, especially as his coin pocket was patted down, and he swatted at Sergeant Giles 
hand and attempted to wiggle away, and yelled that the sergeant was not entitled to frisk him 
(R. 298:147-49,211,215-16). 
At that point, having concluded that defendant did not appear to be under the 
influence of alcohol and that the bottle was empty, Sergeant Giles handcuffed defendant and 
arrested him for driving with a suspended license (R. 298:149, 182, 216). Sergeant Giles 
then began removing items from defendant's pockets (R. 298:150). From defendant's coin 
pocket, Sergeant Giles removed three baggies, one of which appeared and was later 
confirmed to contain methamphetamine; the other two baggies were also later confirmed to 
contain methamphetamine residue (R. 298:150, 154, 159-60, 183). As he located various 
items on defendant, Sergeant Giles placed them on the hood of defendant's vehicle (R. 
298:150). While the sergeant was preoccupied with organizing the items on the trunk, 
defendant quickly leaned forward and then bent down with his face over the trunk (R. 
298:155-56). 
Officer Lopez, who is defendant's observed the entire patdown and arrest. Officer 
Lopez is defendant's step-cousin, has known defendant his (the officer's) whole life, and has 
always been on good terms with defendant and his family (R. 298:215-26). Officer Lopez 
watched Sergeant Giles remove the plastic baggies and other items from defendant's pockets 
and place them on the trunk of the vehicle (R. 298:217-19). Suddenly, he saw defendant lean 
forward, then cock his head backward to try to grasp the baggie of methamphetamine with 
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his lips (R. 298:220-21). Officer Lopez grasped defendant around his neck and shoulder to 
pull him back and at the same time ordered defendant, "Spit it ouf (R. 298:221-22). 
Afterward, Officer Lopez noticed a white powdery substance on the sleeves of his uniform 
(R. 298:222). After things had calmed down, defendant confided in Officer Lopez that he 
did not want to go to jail because he was getting ready to pick up some more 
methamphetamine (R. 298:225-26). Defendant also entreated Officer Lopez to be put in 
contact with another police officer so that he could work as an informant in an effort to avoid 
the current charges (R. 298:226). 
The defense consisted of the testimony of three witnesses, Buddy Kummer, Stan 
Johnson, and Shannon Nielson, each of whom testified that he, she, their friends, or 
defendant himself had been the target of Sergeant Giles' excessive law enforcement efforts 
because of their association with defendant (R. 298:235-40, 245-53,254-60,266). On both 
direct and cross-examination, it was established that Kummer had been convicted of 
obstruction of justice, withholding evidence, and possession of stolen property, and that both 
Johnson and Nielson had multiple convictions for possession of controlled substances, 
including possession of methamphetamine (R. 298:240, 247, 250, 260, 266-67). Neilson 
admitted that she had been addicted to methamphetamine and that one of her prior 
methamphetamine busts occurred while defendant was living with her (R. 298:263, 265). 
Sergeant Giles testified on rebuttal that he held no personal animosity towards defendant. 
Rather, defendant just kept "popping up at the nuisance houses" (R. 278-79). 
6 
Defendant did not move for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the State's case-in-
chief or at the close of evidence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence was more than sufficient to show that defendant was in possession of 
methamphetamine in two distinct drug-free zones. In the first instance, the evidence 
undisputedly shows that defendant's apartment was within a drug-free zone. The evidence 
also shows that he was in possession of methamphetamine when he was stopped and that he 
did not have time to acquire the controlled substance in the extremely brief period during 
which he was not directly observed before he was stopped. Therefore, the jury could have 
reasonably inferred that he possessed the contraband when he left his apartment. In the 
second instance, the evidence shows that defendant was stopped adjacent to a "shopping 
center" that contained two "shopping malls" and which contained a number of stores whose 
business directly and exclusively serve children and young people. Additionally, since the 
purpose of the penalty enhancement statute is to protect children in locations they are likely 
to frequent, the evidence was sufficient to show that the second stop was also located within 
a drug-free zone. 
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ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THERE WAS COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS IN TWO DRUG-FREE ZONES WHILE HE 
POSSESSED METHAMPHETAMINE, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION TO THE 
JURY 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in submitting to the jury 
the question of his guilt for possession of methamphetamine while he was in a drug-free 
zone. Aplt. Br. at 8-13. The claim is demonstrably without record or legal support. 
A. The Plain Error Standard in a Challenge to the Sufficiency of Evidence. 
A defendant who fails to move for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case-in-
chief must demonstrate plain error on appeal. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^  17. "To demonstrate 
plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, 
our confidence in the verdict is undermined.'" Id. at U 12 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). Adapting the plain error test to challenges of insufficient 
evidence, the Holgate court stated: "Thus, to establish plain error, a defendant must 
demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court 
erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. at f 17. 
It is not necessary for the reviewing court to find that evidence at trial established guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Holgate, at J 18. "Rather, we will conclude that the evidence 
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was insufficient when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Id. (quoting 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1212) (emphasis added). 
B. The jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant 
possessed methamphetamine when he left his apartment. 
Defendant does not challenge that his apartment, which Sergeant Giles testified he 
measured with a specialized hand-held laser device to be located within 750 feet of the 
parking lot of one church and 950 feet of the parking lot of another church, to be within a 
drug-free zone (R. 298:140,161 -68). See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (4)(a)(vi), -(ix) & (4)(b) 
(2002) (enhancing a conviction for possession of a controlled substance one degree when 
committed within 1000 feet of the grounds of a church or synagogue). Rather, defendant 
claims that the evidence failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed 
methamphetamine when he left his apartment. Aplt. Br. at 9-11. Defendant argues that 
because Sergeant Giles briefly lost sight of him while the sergeant followed him, the 
prosecution failed to dispel the possibility that defendant stopped and acquired the 
methamphetamine after he left his residence and was beyond the drug-free zone 
encompassing his apartment. Aplt. Br. at 10-11. 
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Defendant's argument fails because the unchallenged evidence showed that defendant 
could not have stopped and acquired the methamphetamine while Sergeant Giles followed 
him. 
Sergeant Giles briefly lost sight of defendant's vehicle as it proceeded north on 50 
East from defendant's apartment (R. 298:139-42). However, the sergeant followed defendant 
by driving up Main Street at the same pace defendant's vehicle was traveling and, correctly 
anticipating that defendant would turn west, waited for defendant's vehicle to approach Main 
Street at 1450 South (R. 298:142, State's Ex. 2). With defendant's vehicle thereafter in sight, 
Sergeant Giles stopped it one-half block further north, where he found methamphetamine on 
defendant's person (R. 298:142-44, 150, 160). Sergeant Giles thought that from the time 
he saw the vehicle leave the apartment until he intercepted it at the intersection of Main 
Street and 1450 South only about thirty to forty-five seconds elapsed, about the same amount 
of time he would expect such a brief trip to take at normal speed (R. 298:143). When asked 
if there might have been time for the driver to stop and talk to someone or do anything, 
Sergeant Giles responded, "Absolutely not" (R. 298:143-44). 
Defendant introduced no evidence to contradict the sergeant's opinion as to the 
minimal length of time he traveled before being stopped, the ready interception of his 
vehicle, or the sergeant's opinion that defendant could not have had the opportunity to stop 
and obtain anything during his brief travel. On this evidence, the jury could have reasonably 
inferred that defendant necessarily possessed the methamphetamine when he left his 
apartment, which was undisputedly within 1000 feet of two churches, and that he was, 
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therefore, within a drug-free zone. In any event, any insufficiency on this point was not "so 
obvious and fundamental" that the trial court plainly erred in submitting the issue to the jury.2 
C. The record and the purpose of the penalty enhancement statute 
support that defendant was stopped within a drug-free zone. 
Defendant argues that the "shopping center" where he was stopped and found with 
methamphetamine is not a "shopping mall," and therefore not a "drug-free" zone within the 
meaning of the penalty enhancement provisions of section 58-37-8 (4)(a)(vii). Aplt. Br. at 
11-13. 
Based on the sufficiency of evidence showing that defendant possessed 
methamphetamine at his apartment, it is unnecessary to address this claim. However, this 
argument fails on the facts and on its own terms. 
Defendant's argument is grounded only in the prosecutor's having argued in closing 
that a "shopping center and a shopping mall are the same for statutory purposes," without 
2
 Defendant also cursorily argues in two sentences and without any legal support 
that, based on Nielson's testimony, the possibility existed that the drugs belonged to 
Nielson and that defendant might never knowingly possessed them. Aplt. Br. at 11. The 
Court should decline to consider this argument for lack of adequate briefing and failure to 
marshal the evidence. See State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 130 (Utah App. 1997) ("A 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research.") (citation omitted); State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, <|6, 36 
P.3d 533 (failure to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of 
insufficiency considered on appeal). In any event, apart from Nielson's doubtful 
credibility (R. 298:261-67, 276-78), defendant's admission to Officer Lopez that he was 
en route to purchase methamphetamine and his immediate attempts to grasp the packet of 
methamphetamine in his mouth upon arrest compellingly show that he knew the nature of 
the substance (R. 298:220-22, 225-26). 
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further record citation. Aplt. Br. at 11 (citing R. 298:304). Giles admittedly referred to the 
collection of stores as a "shopping center." (R. 298:172-75,196). However, he also testified 
that the stop was "right next" to or "mere feet" from a "shopping center" within which there 
were "two shopping malls," which he believed placed it within a drug-free zone (R. 298:172-
75).3 Therefore, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the stop occurred within a drug-
free zone. 
Even if the sergeant's view is deemed undispositive on whether the stop was within 
a drug-free zone, defendant's argument fails on its legal analysis. Defendant argues that, by 
definition, a "shopping center" is not a "shopping mall": 
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth 
Edition, 2000, defines shopping mall as: "1. An urban shopping area limited 
to pedestrians. 2. A shopping center with stores and businesses facing a 
system of enclosed walkways for pedestrians." It defines a shopping center as 
"A group of stores and often restaurants and other businesses having a 
common parking lot." Id. 
Aplt. Br. at 12. 
Based on these definitions, defendant argues that "while a mall may be included as 
a shopping center, a shopping center is not a mall," apparently because a "shopping mall," 
3
 It is undisputed on appeal that the stop occurred within 1000 feet of the shopping 
mall. Sergeant Giles testified that the stop occurred "right next" to or "mere feet" from 
the shopping center or shopping mall and that the RC Willey , which was connected to the 
other stores mentioned, was within the "mall" just off University Parkway (R. 298:140, 
172-75, 207). It was undisputed that defendant was stopped near the intersection of Main 
Street and 1400 South (R. 298:142). State's exhibit 2 corroborates the sergeant's 
testimony that one block is approximately 500 feet (R. 298:207; State's Ex. 2). 
Therefore, because University Parkway is only one block from where defendant was 
stopped (State's Ex. 2), the inference that the stop was located within 1000 feet of a 
shopping "mall" is compelled. 
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strictly defined, does not include a common parking lot or enclosed walkways. Aplt. Br. at 
12. Even accepting the authority of these definitions, the distinction defendant attempts is 
insubstantial. The statute specifically includes within a drug-free zone a Sparking structure 
adjacent'* to a ^shopping mall." Section 58-37-8 (4)(a)(vii). The statute also identifies 
numerous locations that do not contain enclosed walkways, for the obvious reason that such 
a feature is immaterial to the purposes of the statute. Id. As defendant correctly notes, the 
penalty enhancement statute was enacted "to protect the public health, safety and welfare of 
children of Utah from the presumed extreme potential danger created when drug transactions 
occur on or near . . . [public places frequented by children]." State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 
146, 149 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted) (brackets in original)). Aplt. Br. at 12. 
Defendant was stopped next to a RC Willey store, to which was connected a number of 
stores, including Media Play, Old Navy, Pet's Mart, Toys 'R' Us, and Kids 4R' Us (R. 
298:172-75,199,203). Because these businesses directly serve children and are concentrated 
in the same location, they clearly come within the zone protected by the statute. 
In short, the evidence amply showed that defendant was within a drug-free zone when 
he was stopped.4 
4
 Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a 
directed verdict regarding the drug-free zone enhancement penalty at the close of the 
State's case-in-chief. Aplt. Br. at 14-15. However, because defendant's insufficiency 
claim is unsupported by the record, this Court need not consider defendant's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. See State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, U 19, 42 P.3d 1248 
(holding "trial counsel was not ineffective" for failing to raise an objection to the 
sufficiency of the evidence at trial because any such objection "would have been 
denied"), cert denied, 53 P.3d 1 (Utah 2002). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the trial court's sentencing decision should be 
affirmed. 
*4 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this yt> day of January, 2004 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 




CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 58-37-8 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that sure undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conwrtion is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony, or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Xb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(0 Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXii) or (2Xa)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
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suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veter-
inarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
, (iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4)(aXi) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(be) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
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of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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